This paper studies the pump-set industry in rural China, which has led to the widespread diffusion of inexpensive and readily repairable pumping technology in countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Viet Nam. To do so, we first describe the rise of China's pump-set industry, which includes hundreds of small family-owned enterprises that are doing business in a manufacturing cluster located in a single small town in southern China. We then discuss the advantages and disadvantages associated with this type of industrial structure. We conclude by examining the dynamics of the industry that have emerged during the past decade and speculate on future developments of China's pump-set industry and the ways that it may continue to support the further expansion of food production in Asia.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most important development in Asian agriculture during the past 40 years has been the Green Revolution (Pingali, Hossain and Gerpacio, 1997) . However, the Green Revolution did not affect all countries the same. For example, while rice yields in India and Indonesia increased by more than 1.5 per cent during the late 1960s and 1970s (and after), those in Bangladesh and Pakistan grew more slowly during the same period (FAO, 2007) . The Green Revolution was clearly missing in parts of South and South-East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. However, beginning in the mid-1980s, something changed. Rice production in Bangladesh suddenly accelerated, increasing by 2.6 per cent annually between 1985 (FAO, 2007 . Bangladesh, once a large importer of rice, almost achieved 100 per cent self sufficiency in the 1990s (Baffes and Gautam, 1996) . The same thing happened in Pakistan.
Researchers, in their search for the factor that was missing in the earlier phase of the Green Revolution, have found that the rapid diffusion of pumping technology was the reason for the take off of rice production in the 1980s and 1990s (Barker and Molle, 2004; Dawe, 2005; Molle, Shah and Barker, 2003) . In Bangladesh, the total number of shallow tubewells increased from 45,000 in the early 1980s to more than 800,000 by the end of 1990s (Bangladesh, 2001) . The number of small pumps used in these tubewells grew even more rapidly. More significantly, most of these small pumps were privately owned, as relatively reliable and easily repairable pumps became affordable for small farmers. In 1980, tubewell irrigation accounted for just 15 per cent of irrigated area and surface-water irrigation, but by 2000, this percentage had increased to 71; using low-lift pumps accounted for another 15 per cent (Bangladesh, 2003) . The diffusion of pumping technology also revolutionized access to water in other Asian countries (Dawe, 2005; Kikuchi and others, 2003) . For example, between 1980 and 2000 the number of pumps in Viet Nam increased from less than 30,000 to more than 800,000 (Barker and Molle, 2004) . The number of pumps in Sri Lanka rose to more than 100,000 from almost zero.
While researchers have documented the expansion of pumping technology adoption and studied its impact on crop production, few have studied where these small pumps came from. In fact, other pumps were available in the 1960s and 1970s. In the case of Bangladesh, for example, there were pumps from both India and Japan (Bangladesh, 2007) . However, these pumps were not always appropriate for use in the poor, undeveloped countryside. Pumps from India were heavy, difficult to move around and unreliable. Pumps from Japan were lighter and more reliable but also were more expensive than farmers could afford. Additionally, it was not easy to repair Japanese pumps. If they broke down, often they had to be shipped back to Japan for repairs, which was expensive and time-consuming.
So why is it that small, affordable pump sets were quite rare in the 1970s and then suddenly there was a veritable explosion of growth in the 1980s? Two changes over the past two decades may explain the rapid diffusion of cheap pumping technology in some nations. First, many South and South-East Asian countries changed their trade policies and opened their markets to the import of pumps and engines. For example, the Government of Bangladesh began to liberalize agricultural input markets and deregulate the import of irrigation equipment in the mid-1980s (World Bank, 1999) . Viet Nam liberalized its markets significantly between the 1970s and 1980s as part of the doi moi (reform) program (Pingali and Xuan, 1992) . Trade liberalization also has taken place in Pakistan since the late 1980s (Social Policy and Development Centre, 2006) . With these changes in trade policies, falling tariffs contributed greatly to lower prices of and easier access to imported irrigation equipment.
Second, market forces in the global pump-set industry may be responsible for an additional, and perhaps even greater, downward shift in the price and availability of appropriate pumping technology. In particular, one of the most important forces appears to be the emergence of China as a major pump producer and exporter in the 1980s.
The expansion of irrigated acreage in rural China that began in the 1960s stimulated the development of the agricultural pump-set industry in China. During the beginning phases, the industry tended to focus on larger pump sets that were used by communes, factories and municipalities. It was not until decollectivization in the early 1980s and the subsequent reduction in the size of farms in China (Lin, 1992) that there was a shift in the demand for smaller pumps. However, although all pump manufacturers were initially state owned, the rapid change in demand was not met by the unresponsive state sector. The industrial reforms allowed small-scale, profit-oriented manufacturers to appear (Oi, 1999) . When this happened, the production of small pump sets rose rapidly and the cost of manufacturing pumps and engines in China fell.
The number of pumps used inside China for agriculture increased steadily from zero before the late 1970s to more than 16 million in 2000 (figure 1). During this time, manufacturing capacity in China rose so fast that the country began to export pump sets in the early 1980s. Moreover, although China had exported pump sets before 1985, the export amount started to increase rapidly only after 1986, which coincided with the time when rice production started to rise rapidly in some Asian countries (figure 2).
1 Between 1986 and 1989, the total export amount increased by more than four and half times. The dollar amount of the export total includes the export of agricultural pumps as well as pumps used in other sectors (industrial or residential). This is because the General Administration of Customs of China was using the Standard International Trade Classification before 1993. The system classifies pumps according to their types (reciprocating pumps, centrifugal pumps or rotary pumps), but it does not further classify each type of pump according to their usage (agricultural, residential or industrial). As a result, we can see the trend of the total export of all types of pumps only in the 1980s. After 1993, the General Administration of Customs of China adopted the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, which classifies commodities according to usage as well as type. Because of this, we are able to obtain the data that describe the export trend for agricultural pumps for the period beginning in 1993 (figure 3). 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Figure 1. Number of pumps for agricultural use in China (Thousands of units)
Source: Data from China (1973 China ( -2000 .
Figure 2. Total value of pump exports between 1983 and 1989 (Millions of United States dollars)
Source: Data from China (1993; .
Note: Dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation, according to the consumer price index.
The rise of China as a pump exporter together with changes in the trade policy led to the increasing availability of affordable and readily repairable pumping technology globally. Because of its comparative advantage in producing light, industrial products, and due to favourable foreign exchange policies, China was able to move into international markets soon after the liberalization of the agricultural input markets in South and South-East Asia. Between 1993 and 2007, the export of agricultural pump sets from China to most Asian countries increased rapidly. The value of the total imports of Chinese pump sets increased by more than six times in Sri Lanka and more than 10 times in Bangladesh, the Philippines and Viet Nam (figure 3). Today Chinese pump sets dominate the market for mechanized irrigation pumps in Bangladesh and other South Asian countries (International Development Enterprises and Winrock International, 2002; Kabir and Ahmmed, 2005) . Pump sets from China also have become common in Sri Lanka and Viet Nam (Barker and Molle, 2004; 2005) . Source: Data from China (1973; .
Note:
The export value in 2007 does not include exports in December 2007 since the data was not available at the time. Dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation according to the consumer price index.
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T h a i l a n d S r i L a n k a P h i l i p p i n e s P a k i s t a n N e p a l M a l a y s i a I r a n More importantly, the inexpensive small pump sets from China have made pumping technology affordable to poor farmers in developing countries and given them a tool that is readily repairable. Most of the small pump sets sell for less than $10. In Pakistan, where pump subsidies were removed and free import of Chinese pumps was allowed, pumps sold for 35 to 40 per cent less than in India, where Chinese pumps were still not available (International Water Management Institute, 2002) . These pumps, although not of superior quality, were still reasonably reliable for the purpose of shallow tubewell irrigation and low-lift surface-water irrigation. Of equal relevance, because of their less sophisticated nature they were also much more repairable. In fact, the rise of the pump repair industry in Bangladesh-which occured after the large inflow of pumps from China-has been noted to be an important factor is triggering broader rural development. Researchers in India have suggested that removing the pump tariff altogether would be one of the best ways to deliver pumps faster to poor communities in India.
Surprisingly, even though the pump-set industry in China has contributed so significantly to food production growth in South and South-East Asia, almost nothing is known in academic circles about this industry. To our knowledge, there is no study that documents the rise and current status of this source of small pumps and engines and why it has been able to produce such a reasonably reliable and easily repairable product at such an affordable price.
The overall goal of this paper is to increase our understanding of the small-pump-set industry in China. To meet the overall goal, the paper pursues three specific objectives. First, we describe the nature of the small-pump-set industry and explain the organization of the industry in China. Second, we examine the factors that have contributed to or limited its development and success as the supplier of pumps to markets in China and other countries. Finally, we speculate on the future of the pump-set industry and its potential to support the continuing growth of food production in Asia.
In order to achieve our objectives, we will focus on the Daxi pump-set industry cluster. Inside China, Daxi is undisputedly the leader of small-pump-set manufacturing. The Daxi township is located in Zhejiang Province, a coastal province in eastern China that has been undergoing rapid industrial development over the past 25 years (figure 4). Pump manufacturing in Daxi started in the late 1970s and has grown rapidly since then.
3 The Daxi pump-set industry has been Unfortunately, throughout our studies of Daxi, we have encountered a systematic lack of statistical data. The nature of the industry-tens of thousands of small, unregulated, family-run firms-has made it difficult for the Government's statistical bureau and the local government to collect data on these enterprises. A large share of the pump enterprises in Daxi are small factories that can best be characterized as backyard-like, self-employed firms. These small enterprises operate on an informal basis. Many business owners in Daxi do not register their enterprises with either the local bureau of industry or the local chamber of commerce. Officials from the township government told us that many of the smallest enterprises paid no taxes. If they borrowed money to finance any part of their operations, it was typically from relatives or friends on a handshake. Since these enterprises are outside the formal system of regulation, industrial management and finance, it has been difficult for the local government to keep record of them. In fact, there is not even a complete list of the Daxi enterprises.
In order to learn about the Daxi pump-set industry, we made multiple field trips to Daxi between December 2003 and March 2004. 4 During our field trips, we interviewed the owners and managers of nearly 50 factories. The factories where we conducted interviews spanned the spectrum from extremely small parts We also visited Fu'an to get a complete picture of the small-pump-set-industry in China. producers to the largest assembly enterprises in Daxi. Most information in this paper comes from the interviews and observations we made during the field trips.
II. FEATURES OF THE PUMP-SET INDUSTRY IN DAXI

Features of the pumps and engines produced in Daxi
Small-scale electric pump sets are a common product used by agricultural producers and rural consumers in many Asian countries and elsewhere in the world. The pump set consists of two major components: a pump unit and an electric engine (figure 5). Although they come in many sizes, pump sets produced in Daxi are mostly powered by engines that are less than 8 kilowatts. Although lacking in horsepower, these types of pump sets are light enough to be lifted and moved by a single individual. On average, pump sets weigh between 10 and 15 kilograms and are about the size of the small electric home generators commonly found in the United States or other developed countries.
Because of their compact nature and because they are self-contained units (each pump-set unit contains both a pump and an engine), pump sets have many uses in developing countries. Farmers use them for different irrigation operations. In some cases pumps are used to lift water out of canals or rivers for irrigating field crops. In other cases, they are used to deliver water from canals to home gardens and greenhouses. Typically, farmers place the pump unit on the bank of the river or the edge of the shallow well. The pump operator puts an intake hose into the water source. Once connected to an electrical power source, the pump draws water and pushes it out to the field through an outtake hose.
The pumps manufactured in Daxi are highly homogeneous and based on simple technology. Almost all factories there produce centrifugal or submersible pumps. The pumps and engines manufactured by the different factories are similar in terms of size and shape. Although relatively simple in design, functions that these pumps usually serve do not require a sophisticated technology.
The procedure used in manufacturing these small water pumps is also simple, and labour intensive. In fact, local manufacturers designed the earliest pump sets manufactured in Daxi by reverse engineering pumps brought in from elsewhere. At an early stage of the development of the industry (1980s), no enterprises branded its products. It was almost impossible for a consumer to distinguish between these undifferentiated and unbranded pump sets.
Features of the industry in Daxi
Clustering of a large number of enterprises
The most distinctive characteristic of the pump-set industry in Daxi is that it is made up of thousands of pump-related enterprises. An enterprise can be classified as one of two major types: a pump-set assembly plant or a parts supplier. Parts suppliers produce the intermediate inputs that are needed to assemble the pump sets. Assembly plants purchase parts from suppliers to produce the final product, pump sets. It is estimated that there are about 800 pump assembly plants and more than 1,000 parts suppliers in Daxi (Chen, 2004; Wang, Chen and Chen, 2003) .
The sheer number of pump enterprises was immediately visible as we drove into Daxi on our first field trip. From the time we entered the outskirts of the town, buildings with signs and posters indicating that the establishments housed a pump assembly plant or parts supplier lined both sides of the street. Along the 2-kilometre main street, almost 90 per cent of the stores sold pumps or pumprelated parts. There were some other small shops-grocery stores, pharmacies and clothes shops. However, even some of the convenience stores would have a shelf of daily goods for sale in the front and a pump parts-manufacturing facility in the back of the store or on the second floor.
Close physical proximity of enterprises
Since Daxi is a small town of only 129 square kilometres, another distinctive characteristic is that almost all enterprises are located in close physical proximity to one another. The assembly plants and parts suppliers form a veritable cluster of enterprises. Almost all of the enterprises are located inside the town centre. During our field trips, the managers we interviewed at the pump assembly plants told us that they could purchase any given part of their pump sets within a 30-minute travel radius. Indeed, we accompanied an assembler as he was buying parts to complete an order of pumps, and he was able to walk to the three parts suppliers. In making his purchases (he bought a box of bearings, a crate of rotors and 10 plastic casings), our interviewee was never more than 200 meters away from his own plant. The three transactions took less than 45 minutes. Literally, every partner and competitor of every enterprise is a neighbour. When asked about the process of ordering and purchasing parts, the owner of one assembly plant put it best: "Purchasing supplies is just like going to grocery stores; they are just around the corner and there are lots of options to choose from".
High degree of specialization
The enterprises in the Daxi cluster are highly specialized. Typically, each enterprise produces one particular pump or engine part or provides a single type of service. As shown in figure 5 , a pump set requires many parts. During our field trips, simply by looking at the names of the stores along the main street in Daxi, we identified factories that produce each of the parts of a pump-set: Old Chen's Stator Factory, Lucky Rotor Company, Daxi Capacitor, Wang and Sons EnamelInsulated Wire Enterprise. Looking down the first three lanes and alleys of the west side of town, we could see factories that produced the rest of the parts: pump cases, impellers, bearings, valves and seals. There were even enterprises that produced specialty screws and other hardware for the different types of Daxi pump sets. Producing pump sets also requires a number of different services, provided by other businesses that are equally as specialized. In particular, grouped on the road that radiates out from the centrally located township-government complex are enterprises that design pumps, inspect product quality, book transport logistics or provide marketing information.
Small scale
Given the extraordinarily large number of pump enterprises clustered in such a small town, it is not surprising that most of the factories are small. The production spaces of most of the 800 assembly plants are smaller than one-fifth of a hectare. The parts suppliers are even smaller. In fact, some parts suppliers do not even have a dedicated factory building. Many small enterprises are producing in the backyards of their houses. The main street is lined with several three-story houses, and the first two floors of each are workshops for production. The family and some of the enterprise's workers usually live on the third floor.
In such a small space, of course, enterprises have little need for large labour forces or large volumes of capital. Although we do not have systematic data on Daxi, we do have detailed information on 159 small enterprises in Zhejiang from the 2000 China Rural Land and Labour Survey (China, 2000) . 5 These businesses are much like those found in Daxi. According to this survey most self-employed, rural enterprises in China have fewer than 10 employees (table 1) . On average, each business hires two wage-earning labourers. In addition, more than 40 per cent of these self-employed businesses have assets of less than $650 (table 2) . Therefore, assuming that many of the Daxi enterprises (with the exception of some of the larger ones discussed below) are much like those in the rest of our Zhejiang sample, these enterprises might best be characterized as "nano-enterprises," as opposed to micro enterprises.
5
The 2000 China Rural Land and Labour Survey (Zhong Guo Nong Cun Geng Di Lao Dong Li Diao Cha) was conducted by one of the authors, Scott Rozelle, jointly with the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resource Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences. The businesses in the survey were randomly selected from a set of 5 counties, 10 townships and 20 villages. The counties, towns, village and households form a small but representative sample of Zhejiang Province. After ranking the counties of Zhejiang by per capita income, one county was chosen from each income percentile (that is, one from the poorest 20 per cent of the counties); one from the second poorest (20-40 percentile); one from the middle income counties (40-60 percentile); one from the second richest (60-80 percentile); and one from the richest (top 20 per cent of Zhejiang counties). A similar procedure was used to choose two towns in each county (one from the richest half of each county's towns and one from the poorest) and to choose villages in each town. 
Note:
The survey was conducted in late 2000 and collected information on the year 2000. We studied five counties in Zhejiang province, each randomly selected from a different income quintile. In each county, we selected two townships. In each township, we randomly selected one village and then randomly selected 20 households in each village. 
Family owned
One of the unique features about the enterprises in Daxi is that none is state-owned; 100 per cent of the firms are family owned and operated. Even the largest enterprises are owned and controlled by a single family. This is similar to the findings of Cai and others (2007) that studied the overriding pre-eminence of the family enterprise in Zhejiang. Even when enterprises have corporatized, most have only family members as shareholders. Family members also make most of the decisions regarding production, investment, salaries, hiring, firing and enterprise reorganization. Typically, the father (that is, the household head) is the enterprise head; his wife, sons and daughters manage different aspects of the enterprise.
Personal business relationships
Most enterprises in Daxi have developed close relationships with one another. Most business owners are local residents. They know each other personally. Indeed, during our 2004 field trip, we found that in one part of Daxi Township that is known for producing pump cases, a large share of the business owners have the same surnames and belong to the same extended family. While not everyone are close relatives, a large share of the owners of factories or service providing firms were close acquaintances who had grown up together. In many cases, we found that competing suppliers or close collaborators were classmates in school. Most noticeably, during our field trips, it became clear to us that each business owner we interviewed knew most other enterprises well. When we randomly pointed to a firm across the street or referenced an enterprise down the road, the interviewee could almost always tell us who the manager was, what type of pump or parts were produced and, more importantly, what it was like to do business with that enterprise.
Because of this, and because almost all of the key components are produced locally in Daxi, most assembly plants purchase their parts from their neighbours, friends and relatives. Most orders can be placed by a phone call or during an evening stroll down the street or alley. Parts suppliers frequently allow assembly plants to buy on credit. To finalize the supplier credit arrangement, however, there is almost never more than an implicit agreement that the supplier would be paid as soon as the assembler was paid.
While this pump-set cluster in Daxi is almost assuredly unique in the pump-set manufacturing sector worldwide, clustering is not unique in China. In China, clusters have emerged in many other industries. There is a large motorcycle cluster in Chongqing that is made up of more than 200 assemblers and more than 1,000 parts suppliers (Hu, 2003) . In southern Jiangsu, printed-circuit board clusters have emerged in the midst of a number of other industrial clusters (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006) .
The pump-set industry in Daxi also shares characteristics with industrial clusters in other countries. 6 For example, the shoe industry in Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil is a super cluster of more than 1,200 shoe manufacturers and hundreds of supporting enterprises (Schmitz, 1995) . A knitwear industrial cluster in Tiruppur,
6
Industrial clusters ar e defined as concentrations of a large number of enterprises in a single local area and the development of a system of supporting industries that specialize in providing inputs or services (Gordon and McCann, 2000; Porter, 1990) .
India has more than 800 small knitted-cotton textiles factories (Chari, 2000) . There are clusters of auto parts supply firms in Thailand (Lecler, 2002) .
Despite the commonality of clusters in other parts of China and worldwide, it is arguable that Zhejiang Province, where Daxi is located, is one of the largest centres of industrial clustering in world (Zhang, 1999) . For example, in Zhili town (a name that translates literally to "weaving town"), a place near Daxi, a clothing manufacturing cluster has formed in which all the factories produce only simply designed cheap pillowcases and children's clothes (Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka, 2002) . Within Wenzhou city, several clusters have formed that produce low-voltage electric appliances, and cigarette lighters (Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka, 2004) . A footwear industrial cluster consisting of over 4,000 shoemaking factories, 200 leather enterprises, 380 footwear-sole enterprises, 200 footwear-machine manufacturers, 168 footwear-laces factories and a number of other footwear-related industries is also located in Zhejiang province (Huang, Zhang and Zhu, 2007) .
III. ADVANTAGES OF THE PUMP-SET-INDUSTRY CLUSTER IN DAXI
The clustering of a large number of small, highly specialized and family-owned enterprises that are physically close to each other has brought a range of advantages. Some of these advantages were identified by Marshall (1920) : the formation of labour markets; information spillover among enterprises; and the division and specialization of labour among enterprises. These advantages allowed easy entry to and exit from the industry and rapid expansion of production in its early stages. In addition, there are also several other advantages that fit the reality of Daxi: most players are farmers who have little formal training in engineering, management or marketing. In this section, we analyze some of the factors that have allowed the industry to grow since the early 1980s.
Advantages that facilitate entry and exit of firms as well as expansion of production
Availability of local labour
The clustering of a large number of enterprises in Daxi has created a rich pool of affordable labour. According to the Wenling Bureau of Investment (2005) , the local population is far too small to satisfy the demand for labour of the factories. However, the employment opportunities offered by the numerous enterprises in the pump-set cluster have attracted a large number of migrants from nearby provinces. Migrants now account for more than 40 per cent of the population. The constant flow of unskilled migrants also generates an affordable supply of workers, since migrants are willing to work for a wage that is far below what most local residents would accept. The average wage of an unskilled worker in Daxi is about $3.50 per day. When we asked any of the local residents what they expected to earn, it was always $10 per day or more. Access to a reliable pool of low-cost labour has significantly reduced hiring costs for enterprises that are already in the industry.
With access to such a large pool of labour, search costs are also much lower. When asked how they hire new workers, managers and owners told us that they can usually find new workers within a couple of hours. Because there is such a high concentration of factories, each of which has its own workers, there is always a large cohort of labour looking for work at any given time. A manager in search of a worker can simply ask his current employees or a neighbouring manager if they know of anyone looking for a job. According to our interviews, it is not unusual for the manager to return to the factory (after making the inquiries) to find one or more prospective workers waiting for an interview. At the very longest, the manager has to wait until the next day. If a manager is looking for a worker at the end of a workday, he and his workers ask around that evening. By the next moring, there are usually many prospective workers lined up waiting at the plant.
Rapid spread of technology and marketing information
The close physical proximity of enterprises facilitates the exchange of information and technology. The exchange of information, however, is not orchestrated by any government bureau. From our interviews it is clear that even if an enterprise does not want to share information, it is difficult, if not impossible, to keep secrets in Daxi. Although the industry is undergoing change, enterprises often imitate the new designs of products brought from the large state-owned factories in nearby metropolitan areas such as Shanghai and Hangzhou. As soon as any new product begins to sell well, it is almost immediately ("within several days," according to one small-enterprise owner) copied by a large number of competing enterprises. The same thing happens when a plant receives a new order from a new part of the country or from a new overseas market. Every other plant owner knows who is scaling up and within days or even hours everyone in Daxi knows about the new market or new marketing channel. The rapid spread of information among the enterprises has enabled firms to procure market information and product knowledge without investing heavily in research and development (R&D) or marketing.
Low initial capital investment
Access to hundreds of parts suppliers also significantly reduces the initial capital investment required to start an assembly plant. An assembly plant can purchase all the material inputs needed for manufacturing pumps locally. Instead of investing a great deal in equipment to be able to manufacture parts on its own, an assembly plant has needed only to finance a stock of inventory. In the eyes of many, there is no need to invest in building marketing channels because each assembly plant can use local sales agents. During our interviews, several pioneers in the industry told us that that they needed only to invest a few hundred dollars to rent a room and hire several workers to start their businesses.
Low production costs
In addition to the easy access to the large pool of low-cost labour, access to hundreds of parts suppliers also lowers production costs significantly. Most obviously, the production of one single product lowers the cost of producing each part through economies of scale. In addition, competition among parts suppliers lowers prices of the material inputs. During our interviews, owners of the assembly plants told us that when they purchased parts, one common strategy was to negotiate with several suppliers at the same time. The fierce competition among parts suppliers induces the parts supplier as a group to lower their prices. Being close to parts suppliers also reduces transportation, inventory and other logistic costs.
Low transaction costs
The close personal relationships among Daxi enterprises form business relationships that greatly decrease transaction costs. Since people know each other, they can trust each other. With these localized circles of trust, almost 100 per cent of the transactions among enterprises in Daxi are carried out without a written contract. One of the most obvious manifestations of this trust is that while there are thousands of factories and service enterprises in Daxi, in the phone book there is not one listing for a lawyer. In nearly 50 interviews, not one owner or manager reported any serious conflict that went unresolved. If there are major conflicts, even though there are no legal procedures, the punishment of the party that is at fault is loss of reputation, and it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for that person to do business with others in Daxi. Because reputation in such a setting is so important, one manager told us that no one would ever do anything to endanger one's reputation (implying this is the reason that there are so few unresolved conflicts).
Competitive and cooperative relationships
In such an environment, although most of the assembly plants are competitors (as are parts suppliers at another level), enterprises also cooperate from time to time. For example, when we were in Daxi, one small enterprise secured an order for more than 1,000 pump sets. This order needed to be finished in less than one month. There was no way that the firm could have built that many pump sets in the time available. Therefore, the enterprise owner sub-contracted different parts of the order to other small assembly plants. The manager told us that usually the other party would reciprocate later-either by giving an order back or by lending workers if needed. These low transaction costs and the competitive cooperation that distinguish business relationships in Daxi helped many enterprises develop in their early stages.
Flexibility
In many cases, being small in size also makes enterprises more flexible and more adaptable to changes in market conditions. Although this is changing, entering or exiting the industry has generally been easy for a small enterprise, since it requires little capital investment to enter and there are few sunk costs to consider when exiting. The small nature of the firms also make it easy for firms to adjust their levels of production. For example, when market demand is high, as seen above, assembly plants sometimes sub-contract a share of their orders to other assembly plants. Being small, these factories can start production on short notice.
Advantages in industry accessability
In addition to the advantages that have made it easy for firms in Daxi to enter, exit and expand production efficiently, a number of cluster facets facilitated the industry's rapid early growth by making it easy for individuals-especially those in this relatively underdeveloped area of China-to develop their businesses. Before entering the business, most plant owners were either farmers or working as migrant workers; few plant owners or managers had any advanced training or formal vocational education. Prior to the 1980s, literally none had had any experience in running a business. Hence, in such a case, the simpler business was, the better.
Ease of the organization of production
Also of great importance is the high degree of specialization, which lowers the level of organization skills required. Since Daxi contains the entire spectrum of parts suppliers, each enterprise typically only has to produce a single product (either the assembled pump set or one of the parts in the pump set). Since there is such a high degree of specialization, the production process for each is also simple from an engineering point of view. For example, there is almost no need to hire different types of specialized workers to produce the different parts. Additionally, small enterprises do not require extremely complex management skills to organize production activities.
The simple nature of the technology
Small-water-pump manufacturing, although labour intensive, does not require a lot of skill or technical knowledge. The low technical content in the manufacturing process of pumps makes it relatively easy for newcomers-usually rural residents from surrounding areas-to enter the industry. Technological changes, can be easily adopted by enterprises. This is the case in Daxi. In interview after interview, we were told that although at first the manufacturing process seemed difficult to the new operators and managers, all had quickly been able to master the skills involved.
Low requirements for marketing
The production of undifferentiated products also has tended to make it easier to target consumers and requires less sophisticated (and less expensive) marketing. There has been no need to conduct marketing research to develop or hold niche markets. With such products, retail buyers have cared most about price. There are few expectations about other characteristics of the product, such as a manufacturer guarantee or the convenience of use. The homogeneity of products has also enabled all the enterprises in the industry to compete as a whole with enterprises outside the cluster.
Strong incentives
Although we raise this last, it is not the least important of the features of the Daxi pump-set cluster. The family nature of businesses in the town provides the key figures in each firm with strong incentives to work hard and make careful and timely decisions. In their paper on family enterprises in China, Cai and others (2007) argue that a significant share of the rise of China as a manufacturing giant is attributable to family enterprises. When managers and key employees are members of the family who owns the enterprise, there is a gain in productivity. In these cases the incentives are strong in that such employees share in the profits of the enterprise; as such, they require relatively little monitoring.
The industrial strategy of clustering in the pump-set industry in Daxi-at least at this stage of development-has succeeded. Thousands of parts suppliers and pump assemblers have produced literally millions of small and cheap pumps. On average, Daxi pumps were and continue to be about 30 per cent cheaper than similar pumps produced in other parts of China. This low price has made the pump-set industry highly competitive in the domestic market. Pumps produced in Daxi account for more than half the market share in the domestic small-pump market (Zhu, 2002) . Daxi almost certainly exported more of these small pumps than any other single (or cluster of) factories in the rest of the world. Because of this, to an extent never possible before, these cheap small pumps offer an affordable irrigation option to farmers from China and other developing countries. As the owners and managers of the Daxi pump-set assembly plants who we interviewed told us, their products were exported to many South-East and South Asian countries. The value of the exported pump sets was more than $30 million per year in the early 2000s. Because of the pumps and engines imported from China, the rice economies in many countries of South-East and South Asia have developed rapidly over the past two decades (Barker and Molle, 2004) .
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF THE PUMP-SET INDUSTRY CLUSTER IN DAXI
In this section, we examine the factors that limit the further development of the industry. As discussed in the previous section, the organization of the Daxi pump-set industry was quite successful in its earlier stages of development. Its success depended in part on a number of the features of the pump-set technology and the organization of the industry in Daxi. However, for a number of reasons, Daxi also faced (and continues to face) a number of disadvantages. Although they may not have posed high barriers in the earlier stages of development, it is possible that, in the longer run, some of these disadvantages could restrict the growth of the industry in Daxi. Ironically, as we will see, some of the factors that bestowed advantages on the industry in its earlier phases have the potential of becoming disadvantages as the industry matures and as China develops.
Weak intellectual property rights protection and limited R&D investment
Despite the advantages that enterprises enjoy from the clustering of enterprises, this structure has generated strong disincentives to invest in R&D. During our interviews we sought out the owners and managers of enterprises that were considered leaders in the industry because they had taken initiatives in developing new products or investing in differentiating their current products. All these innovators told us the same story. As soon as their enterprises develop a new way of manufacturing or assembling a pump set or in any way made changes to differentiate their products from those of their competitors, innovations are almost instantaneously imitated by their neighbours. In many cases the innovators told us that others often begin copying their new product before it is even introduced to the market.
Given the nature of the cluster, technology passes from one enterprise to another in many ways-most of them simple and direct, since the imitating enterprises are often just next door. Sometimes information leaks out through exchanges of workers. Sometimes information gets out accidentally through the usual daily interactions. In one case the wife of an innovator passed the new breakthrough to a competitor (the nephew of the innovator) after an hour of evening gossip with the nephew's wife.
Although the high degree of specialization makes entry into the industry easy since it reduces the required level of initial capital investment (as well as production costs), the reliance on a large number of parts suppliers outside an enterprise (which is called outsourcing in Daxi) also increases the probability that any new technological innovation will be stolen. New technologies are often passed on by those involved in the design service sector. In the creation of pump sets, one of the most technical steps is the design and manufacture of the moulds for some important parts (such as the impellor). The mould determines the shape of the parts, and is one of the key determinants of quality. When an assembly plant designs a pump, it must hire an enterprise to design moulds for key parts that the parts supplier can use to manufacture the parts. Few assembly plants have the capacity to develop moulds by themselves. Consequently, even innovative assembly plants need to provide information on the new technologies to designers and mould developers. Even though the assembly plants plead with the mould designers to keep the design secret, according to the assemblers, new secrets are never secrets for long. In many cases the interviewees said that the leaks could have only come from the design enterprise. Sometimes design employees sold the design to a competitor assembly plant. In other cases assembly plants bribed design company engineers to leak the new product. Whatever the channel, design enterprises are notoriously porous.
As a result of the poor protection of technology, there has been little motivation for enterprises to invest seriously in refining the manufacturing process or upgrading the quality of a pump set as a way to gain a competitive edge in the market. Even when a change is made to improve the pump set and the change is protected, imitators are able to mimic the outside of the pump. This has made it difficult for buyers of pump sets to distinguish between the old and new styles of pumps. Leading enterprises quickly lose their chances to charge a price premium for the improved product. Because buyers can not tell which product is better, demand for improved products has grown sluggishly, if at all.
Few measures can be taken to protect a brand. In some cases, enterprises even suffer losses in their attempt to stay a step ahead of imitation from other factories. For example, the Jinlong (or Golden Dragon) Water Pump Factory-one of the earliest innovators in terms of creating materials that made their pumps last longer and perform more reliably-had to change its brand name every several years. The problem was that as soon as it started making above-average profits on its new variety of pump sets, scores of small assembly plants began manufacturing gold coloured pump sets with dragon patterns on the outside of the pump. When orders began to fall and complaints rose from buyers that thought they were buying the premium pump sets, the enterprise changed its name to Crocodile. Within months, numerous small assembly plants were painting their pump sets green and changed the dragon pattern to crocodile patterns. In 2001 the enterprise changed its name again to Pump King. Each change of name, according to the owner, cost the enterprise tens of thousands of dollars and a lot of effort. In addition, each time the enterprise changed its brand, it lost some of its old customers because they had trouble locating the products.
Poor quality control
In the process of outsourcing, since it is difficult for the pump assembly plant to monitor the production of parts, an enterprise loses much of its control over parts quality. Because of competitive pressures, parts suppliers are always looking for a way to shave fractions of pennies off their cost bases and often compromise quality if they can get away with it. A pump made with low quality parts, of course, is low quality itself. During our interviews, we heard repeated complaints from the pump assembly factories about the reliability of their parts suppliers.
General lack of management expertise
Although the family-owned nature of enterprises provides strong incentives, it also brings with it limitations. A family's members do not always have the range of skills needed to run a complex enterprise. In several of our interviews, we were told that the greatest limitation to expanding the size and profitability of the enterprise was that there was no member of the family that understood a specific aspect of the business: e.g., engineering, financing, management or marketing. Hiring professional managers did not work well, partly due to the family-owned nature of the enterprises. Because families in the area are tightly knit, managers that are hired often feel like outsiders and believe they are not treated fairly. Family business owners complained that in many cases they invested a lot to train a manager, who, because of the low start-up costs, took the technology and skills of the family business and started up a competitive enterprise. Such ex-employees would often also steal workers and customers.
Vulnerability to market shocks and lack of access to bank loans
Although being small fosters flexiblity, it also imposes costs. Above all, the small size of Daxi enterprises makes them vulnerable to unexpected changes in market conditions. Ups and downs in the market easily force enterprises out of business. For example, during our field visits, we learned that quite a few small pump assembly plants went out of business because the price of copper (the key input in producing insulated wires) rose significantly. Furthermore, the small size of many of the enterprises limits their ability to expand production or upgrade quality. Small enterprises are less likely to invest in longer term projects that may be risky in the short term. Additionally, the small size of enterprises also diminishes the chance of enterprises to apply for and receive bank loans. As a result, enterprises often do not have enough capital to invest in upgrading equipment or hiring more or higher skilled workers. As a result, most small enterprises have stayed small for most of the past two decades.
Low value-added and low quality products
Because of the limitations on the ability to expand production or upgrade the quality of the product, most enterprises have stayed small and continue to manufacture basic and undifferentiated pump sets. Simple technology has made it difficult to create a high value-added product. The fierce competition has driven profit margins down to just about zero, covering only the costs of land, labour and capital. The homogeneity of products has meant that every pump enterprise is competing in the exact same market. In order to increase their profit margins (or according to the many interviewees: "to keep from losing money"), many assembly plants and parts factories have opted to use inferior materials for inputs and parts. The enterprises have not invested in maintaining their equipment; most do not have the resources. Most of the factories we visited were still using old machines even though the precision of the equipment had deteriorated over time. Several of these factories had eliminated all pre-market testing of their assembled pumps. Quality, according to our interviews, had declined sharply.
Because of the extreme cost pressures, the pump assemblers have not been able to respond to the needs of their customers. Partly due to the low quality of their products, at the time of our visit no pump assembly plant in Daxi offered after-sale service. Warranty programs have been discontinued. The township government official told us that the industry's low quality has become a barrier to its further development. He said plain and simply that, although inexpensive, "Daxi pump sets have become a symbol for inferior quality manufacturing." The Bureau of Technical Supervision in Zhejiang Province named Daxi as a "Zhejiang Province Regional Quality Problem" town. In some sense, part of the industry is in a low-level equilibrium trap: low profits have led to low quality; low quality limits profitability; and weak intellectual property protection reduces the willingness of enterprises to invest in further development of new designs or new plants with old designs.
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V. THE DYNAMICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDUSTRY
Despite the early success that was, in large part, fuelled by a number of special advantages that were inherent to Daxi and those involved with the industry, as seen in the previous section the remaining disadvantages may be putting the future of the industrial cluster in doubt. However, it is possible that a new dynamic is emerging. In the midst of this race to the bottom, a group of elite firms has emerged. The four largest and most prominent are SHIMGE, Dayuan, Dafu and Taifu. These elite firms have adopted and continue to develop new strategies to expand their production and upgrade the quality of their products. The development of these elite firms can be divided into two phases: the quantity expansion phase before 1998 and the quality upgrade phase after 1998. In fact, emergence of this trend of quality upgrading may be seen in the later development stages of other industrial clusters in rural China (Sonobe, Hu and Otuska, 2004) . Although low quality has increasingly become a problem in the development of the industry in the twenty-first century, it does not discredit the contributions of the small pumps in the past. These pumps, although not of superior quality, are reasonably reliable for the purpose of shallow tubewell irrigation or low-lift surface water irrigation. These simple functions do not require high-quality irrigation equipment. Partly due to the fact that they are relatively low quality (when compared to pumps from Japan), these pumps are affordable. Even relatively poor farmers in developing nations, such as Bangladesh and Viet Nam, are able to access enough capital to buy the pumps. Many of the small pump sets generally sell for less than $10. Because of the low prices, almost all small pumps are privately owned. Furthermore, because of their less sophisticated nature, they are also much more repairable.
Before 1998, the elite firms focused on increasing their production capacity by investing in equipment and facilities and reforming production processes. For example, the Dayuan company invested more than $1.3 million in purchasing equipment and buildings. In fact, the owner of Dayuan used the profits from his transportation business in Guangzhou to finance his expansion in pump production capacity. The elite firms also invested in the creation of more streamlined assembly lines, which enhanced their production efficiency and reduced their labour costs. After making such investments, the production capacity of these elite firms rose. For example, the production of Taifu increased from only 500 pumps in 1985 to more than 10,000 annually in the early 1990s.
With the larger production capacity, the elite firms gradually began the process of vertically integrating their operations. Whereas in the past they would purchase all their parts from surrounding suppliers, the elite firms have now begun to produce more of their own parts-especially the key ones. The firms also found that while their costs may have risen, by producing their own parts, they are able to control the quality more closely and guard their technology better.
Although the elite firms started to reform their businesses in the early 1990s, significant changes to the industry did not take place until after 1998, when the Daxi township government signed on to a quality rectification plan. This action was initiated by the provincial government to tackle the quality problems of several different commodities in Zhejiang province (e.g., low-voltage electrical appliances, footwear, etc.). Although the provincial government did not design the plan to target Daxi specifically, most firms in the pump-set industry were hit hard. The Daxi township government started with submersible pumps. As the name suggests, the entire pump-set is placed fully in water during operations and is supposed to be completely waterproof. Because of a number of accidents caused by the use of low-quality products, the government began to crack down on the quality problem. Production licenses became mandatory before a firm was allowed to produce submersible pumps. The township government put a lot of effort into implementing and monitoring the licensing regulation. Many enterprises had to stop production for a while or even exit the industry because they could not reach the quality standards specified in the approval of production licenses. New firms also found it much more difficult to enter the industry than before. The number of pump enterprises assembling submersible pumps fell by more than half during this period. The growth of many enterprises has been stagnant since then.
The quality rectification, however, did not impose negative effects on elite firms such as Dafu and SHIMGE since they were able to meet the productionlicense requirements. They also learned other lessons. For example, we were told during interviews that the rectification campaign increased their awareness of the importance of quality. For the first time since the mid-1980s, the elite firms began to invest heavily in quality inspection and the equipment that they needed to maintain quality. Quality control facilities are crucial in helping manufacturers of metallurgy products control product quality. For example, the investment into equipment by one of the elite firms was less than $26,000 in 1989. By the late 1990s, the firm increased expenditures to more than $0.8 million. Since so few firms originally inspected the quality of their products, there were no trained inspectors. Therefore, elite firms had to train their own technicians to operate and maintain the quality-inspecting equipment.
After upgrading the quality of their products, the elite firms began to signal the superior quality of their products by getting their products certified. Most elite firms obtained national certificates under programmes such as Zhejiang Province Famous Trademarks or Zhejiang Province Excellent Products. These certificates are issued by quasi-governmental bureaus whose objective is to promote higher-quality manufacturing in China. Some elite firms have even obtained quality certificates that are internationally recognized. SHIMGE, Taifu and Duyuan are all now ISO9001 and ISO9002 certified. SHIMGE also introduced an environmental management system that helps it meet the ISO 14001 standard.
With the new and safer environment, the elite firms also started to invest in R&D. They realized that as long as their products were based on simple and easily adoptable technology, they could be easily copied and would never be able to be sold as high value-added commodities. The best way to prevent imitation, according to the manager of one firm, was to produce products that were technically more difficult. To do so, these elite firms began to hire their own engineers and technicians from colleges and research institutes such as Hangzhou Machine and Electric Research Institute in the School of Mechatronical Engineering at Hangzhou Dianzi University and Nanjing Technology University. They also hired employees with particular skills away from large State-owned enterprises. According to the manager of SHIMGE, out of their 600 employees, more than 150 are well-trained technicians.
Recently there has been a trend to hire even more expertise. In 2004, SHIMGE hired an engineering professor, Dr. Tun Lin from Jiangsu University, who is the leading researcher in pump technology. Dr. Lin comes to the SHIMGE factory in Daxi several times each year to work on developing new technology.
The investment in R&D has paid off for the elite firms. With its high-profile R&D team, SHIMGE became the leading producer of larger pumps that are used for deeper wells, a market in which there has been less competition and higher profits. The company also produced the first screw pump, a type of pump that can be used to extract water from more than 80 meters below the ground surface. The screw pump is more energy efficient. Deep water submersibles and submersible screw pumps are much more difficult to copy than the smaller pumps sets that can be used only in shallow wells or for lifting surface water. In fact, during our field trips, we saw only a few enterprises that produced and sold the more technical products.
Furthermore, as the quality of the product rose, the elite firms started to develop new marketing strategies, including branding and advertising. To differentiate their products from those in the traditional segment of the industry, the elite firms have begun to mark each part of their pump with their trademark. These firms now advertise on local agricultural and rural radio stations. They have begun to put up billboards on highways. Two firms have contracted with a national advertiser and have placed commercials that air nationally and internationally. For example, Dayuan spent $430,000 on advertising on the central TV station in China (CCTV), about 60 per cent of which was on the national channel (CCTV1) and the rest on the international channel (CCTV4).
The importance of the changes of strategy and new directions of the industry can be seen clearly in the relative performance of the elite firms as compared to the undifferentiated firms. The elite firms that had the business foresight to upgrade the quality of their products have continued to grow. For example, SHIMGE produced only around 7,000 pump sets annually in 1989. Due to rapid expansion, since 2000, it has been producing more than 500,000 units annually. When SHIMGE was first established in 1989, it purchased 100 per cent of its parts from outside suppliers. The share of outsourced parts fell to 20 per cent in 1995. Today, SHIMGE produces 100 per cent of its parts internally. The production capacity of Taifu increased from 500 pumps in the late 1980s to more than half a million units in 2003.
We interviewed several enterprises that started at the same time as the elite firms but stayed small. These firms invariably have been able to produce only low-quality pumps during the past 20 years. In fact, one of the interviewees-the owner of Changhong told us that the owner of SHIMGE had advised him more than a decade ago to upgrade his firm's quality. He did not follow the advice. He now laments the fact that it is too late, and that he missed the best opportunities.
Clearly, a revolution is taking place, with the rise of the elite large firms and the reduction in the number of small enterprises. During our last visit, many small firms recognized that their industry was going through a transformation. Smaller firms were hoping that their businesses could last another 10 years. Medium-sized to large firms were looking for ways to expand and join the elite firms. The largest firms were hoping that they could move out of their old cluster-bound, low-level equilibrium trap. They were planning new strategies to modernize further and keep their competitive edge. It is clear that the race is not over.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without the access to cheap pumping technology, farmers in South and South-East Asia would not have been able to take advantage of the miracles of the Green Revolution. In this paper we have traced the origins of the small pump sets that revolutionized agriculture in Asia. Our analysis has taken us back to both the geographical source of the pump sets and their economic beginnings. Specifically, we have documented the story of how China became the supplier of the developing world's small pump sets. In its metamorphosis from a Socialist country that as recently as the 1970s restricted private entrepreneurship or any pursuit of profits to one of the world's most unfettered, capitalistic industrial clusters in the reform era, China has been able to supply the missing link for many farmers who need a source of power to lift water from wells, canals and rivers to irrigate their crops at an affordable price.
Several lessons here may be worth studying. First, when left to itself, a country with a motivated, entrepreneurial population can organize its own industry to supply key products that are in demand. The formation of industrial clusters, including that of pump sets, were not directed by any government agency but emerged on their own. In doing so, the economic activity was a good fit for the features of the local economy and its actors, which provided a competitive edge. Hundreds of small firms clustered together so they could tap the economies of scale enjoyed by large factories without the need for the capital input, risk-coping assistance or industrial organizations that often act as barriers for developing countries that are trying to industrialize. While the strategy was dependent on preconditions in China (e.g., sources of liquidity and a minimum level of technological expertise) and thus may not be universally replicable, in many parts of the world these conditions do apply. China has shown that small rural firms, when allowed to emerge free of government interference and to become competitive, can make inroads into world markets while at the same time provide employment and profits for the domestic economy.
Second, it has also become clear that, in the long run, such simple forms of technologies also have a number of disadvantages. While close interaction among firms facilitates the flow of information, inputs and managerial skills, it can also hamper investment in R&D and discourage the development of quality products and higher value-added manufacturing and services. If this goes unchecked, industrial clusters run the risk of entering a "race to the bottom." It is perhaps at this point in the development of industries that governments may want to encourage the development of branding and research. If effective ways are created, it has been shown that out of the same industrial forces that created the intense competition among microfirms, large, respectable firms with coherent strategies for R&D quality improvement and branding can emerge.
